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Rowan affirment sans ambages: "the docu-
mentary évidence, however, demonstrates 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that thèse claims 
are, at best, figments of a fertile imagination 
bulwarked by an extraordinary publicity 
sensé and, at worst, downright fabrications". 
Malgré le bilan assez négatif de la situa-
tion actuelle, les deux auteurs n'en prédisent 
pas moins des jours meilleurs pour la négo-
ciation collective multinationale et ce sur la 
base des faits suivants: en premier lieu, il y a 
des personnes occupant des positions impor-
tantes qui voient dans la négociation multina-
tionale un outil pour accroître leur prestige et 
leur pouvoir. Parmi ceux-ci on retrouve des 
officiers d'organisations syndicales interna-
tionales ou régionales ainsi que des fonction-
naires travaillant pour le compte d'organis-
mes gouvernementaux internationaux ou 
régionaux, tels le Bureau international du tra-
vail. En second lieu, le développement de la 
co-détermination ou co-gestion dans certains 
pays comme l'Allemagne ou la Suède permet 
à certains dirigeants syndicaux d'occuper de 
hautes fonctions administratives à l'intérieur 
des entreprises multinationales et ceux-ci, 
comme c'est le cas pour Charles Levinson qui 
siège sur le conseil d'administration de la 
compagnie Du Pont d'Allemagne, seront dé-
sormais bien placés pour encourager le déve-
loppement d'un tel type de négociation col-
lective. Enfin, et ce qui semble le plus impor-
tant du point de vue des auteurs, l'établisse-
ment par les organismes gouvernementaux in-
ternationaux comme l'OCDE et le BIT de 
codes d'éthique régissant le comportement 
des corporations multinationales procure un 
forum idéal aux technocrates syndicaux et 
gouvernementaux qui désirent pousser l'idée 
de la négociation multinationale. 
Le principal reproche que l'on peut 
adresser à ce volume est qu'il semble implici-
tement prendre partie contre l'idée de la 
négociation multinationale sans cependant 
expliquer les inconvénients que pourraient 
comporter un tel type de négociation. Pour-
tant, lorsqu'une succursale d'une multinatio-
nale essaye de fermer ses portes et de mettre à 
pied des centaines d'employés sans avoir à 
rendre des comptes au gouvernement du pays 
où elle était installée, on peut se demander s'il 
n'est pas plutôt logique de chercher, comme 
le fait actuellement l'OCDE, à imposer un 
minimum d'obligations à la compagnie-mère 
qui a généralement empoché des profits inté-
ressants pendant plusieurs années. Là-dessus, 
les auteurs sont silencieux et il est regrettable 
que leur analyse n'ait pas cherché à évaluer 
les avantages et les inconvénients de la négo-
ciation collective multinationale. 
Jean BOIVIN 
Université Laval 
Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the 
Labor Process under Monopoly Capital-
ism, by Michael Burawoy, Chicago, 
Illinois, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1979, 267 pp. 
Michael Burawoy's récent work is one of 
those rare pièces that should command wide 
attention in the industrial sociology litera-
ture, and for good reasons. It is a book about 
industrial workers by a participant on the 
shop floor of a machine shop. The data pre-
sented includes a textural account of the 
everyday world of work. Furthermore, the 
author's major focus is to demonstrate how it 
is that consent to work, consent to rules im-
posed by management and the trade union, 
and consent to the legitimacy of the capitalist 
profit-making system is produced at the point 
of production and largely independent of ex-
ternal forces such as schooling, family ties, 
mass média, the state apparatus, and so on. 
Now although the concern with workers' con-
sent and commitment is not new to main-
stream industrial sociology, it is unique for 
those interested in théories of changes in the 
labor process as is Burawoy. 
This study, however, is not a debate with 
the marxist school, which virtually alone has 
theorized about the capitalist labor process. 
This is somewhat surprising considering 
Burawoy borrows much from the marxist tra-
dition, and his concern with consent is bor-
rowed from Antonio Gramsci, the late Italian 
marxist theoretician and leader of the Italian 
Communist Party, in his well-known passage 
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"hegemony hère (in the U.S.) is born in the 
factory." Instead, the author présents a wide 
survey of the mainstream industrial sociology 
literature, as well as management and organi-
zation théories. He incorporâtes many of 
their concepts into his own analysis while pre-
senting a critique of a narrow sélection of 
classical marxism. While some of your more 
careful readers will probably criticize 
Burawoy for selecting what appears to be the 
best of various doctrines and methods in 
building his own model, students of indus-
trial sociology will find much that is useful. 
It seems clear by now, and my own re-
search based on nearly four years of expérien-
ces as an assembly-line worker for the Gen-
eral Motors Corporation attests to it, that 
participant observation studies of social rela-
tions on the shop floor of American industry 
are important because they facilitate access to 
data on interaction among workers, between 
workers and the company, and, just as im-
portant, between workers and their union 
représentatives. Such analyses enable us to 
witness the spécial characteristics of the mod-
em enterprise which produce and reproduce 
social relations (like those mentioned above), 
as well as the profit-system from which dérive 
various social, political, and économie insti-
tutions. We can learn about work culture, the 
formation of informai work groups, manage-
ment programs, and industrial relations Sys-
tems as they impact on (and are shaped by) 
the daily requisites of capitalist production 
and labor and product markets. On this 
score, Burawoy has much to say about how 
thèse factors converge in the organization of 
work, assuming ail the while that workers, 
union officiais, and managers are rational be-
ings, albeit they often hâve conflicting in-
terests and ambitions. 
This récognition leads Burawoy to chal-
lenge certain mainstream sociological as-
sumptions about work. For example, he as-
sumes the gênerai marxist proposition that 
exploitation is inhérent in the capitalist labor 
market and wage System in arguing that there 
does not exist an underlying harmony in the 
shop. Yet, he does not accept the marxian 
emphasis on the fragmentation and atomiza-
tion of the working class or the argument that 
expenditure of effort at work is decided by 
coercion alone. Contrariwise, he writes 
"Conflict and consent are not primordial 
conditions but products of the particular or-
ganization of work" (p. 12). For Burawoy is 
interested at least as much in patterns of con-
flict dispersion and spontaneity of social rela-
tions (which do not lead toward industrial 
conflict) as in the " self-organization of 
workers" in explaining why and how workers 
acquiesce to capitalist profit-making and 
hegemony in the industrial setting. 
Burawoy proposes that workers consent 
to exploitative capitalist relationships by 
treating activities on the shop floor as a séries 
of games in which machine operators attempt 
to achieve levels of production output within 
the constraints of what he refers to as the 
developing internai labor market and inter-
nai state. Such games enable thèse workers 
(within the piece-rate system) to earn incen-
tive pay but also provide a social framework 
for evaluating the production activities and 
social relations that arise from the organiza-
tion of work. The need for workers to play 
games also has the function of dissolving the 
tendency towards class conflict between 
workers and management, since they must 
cooperate with each other to fulfîll their job 
tasks ~ workers to make their rate or better it 
(called "making-out"), and management to 
meet production schedules and realize a pro-
fit for the company. But for Burawoy, such 
an organization of work, with the premium 
on making-out, leads to one other significant 
change on the shop floor. While inter-class 
struggles disappear, intra-class struggles 
divide workers further as, for example, ma-
chinists and their auxiliary workers tend to 
feud over their diverse individual interests in 
making-out. If the author sees collective bar-
gaining relations and company hegemony 
facilitating the breakdown of the collective 
worker into an individual ("industrial citi-
zen"), the compétitive pressures from piece-
rate work guarantee the décline of organized, 
collective conflict in the shop. Put different-
ly, thèse games generate the consent to rules 
and expenditure of effort that enable capital-
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ist society to collectively organize workers by 
bringing them together to work, under funda-
mentally exploitative circumstances, and re-
alize profits without political challenge. The 
simultaneous process of obscuring and secur-
ing profits that Burawoy points to, explained 
partly by the games workers play, enable him 
to stress the significance of the interdepen-
dence of workers, union, and shop-level 
management that underpin capitalist hegem-
ony in the workplace. In such a fashion, the 
author utilizes the concepts "game" and 
"consent" for analytical purposes and as a 
radical critique of capitalist society. 
Burawoy's analysis is intriguing for its 
unique mixture of participant observation 
and historical and comparative méthodol-
ogies by comparing his research with Donald 
Roy's important study of the same shop some 
thirty years earlier, especially his emphasis on 
changes in the labor process over this period. 
However, it is also questionable whether the 
data he présents and the labor problems he 
chooses to address can legitimately be gen-
eralized to the whole of the capitalist labor 
process. On the contrary, his study is about 
piece-rate production in one machine shop. 
Does the particular organization of work 
found in Burawoy's shop approximate the 
rest of U.S. industry? Are ail skilled workers 
prone to see their material interests in purely 
individualistic terms? Are there important 
différences between worklife in auto plants, 
steel mills, coal mines, electronic plants, and 
small machine shops such as Burawoy's? 
Thèse are just some of the questions which re-
quire attention before we can generalize to 
the whole of the labor process. Moreover, 
Burawoy fails to consider the social signifi-
cance of industrial relations Systems and the 
relevant trade union except to include the 
union in his internai state thesis and make 
some vague références to unions carrying out 
class struggle. Do not certain industrial con-
flicts develop from collective bargaining rela-
tions on the shop floor? Does not some of 
this conflict destabilize company hegemony 
when it leads toward collective organization 
among rank-and-file workers? Is it legitimate 
to consider dialectical relations between rank-
and-file workers and their union officiais? 
Burawoy is certainly not sensitive to thèse 
questions while accepting the union-
corruption thesis uncritically. This is not a 
surprising omission, since both mainstream 
industrial sociology and contemporary marx-
ist theory hâve failed to develop a Sociology 
of Trade Unionism that compares with the 
work done on the capitalist labor process. It 
is both a shame and an opportunity lost that 
we can learn more about industrial relations 
from the economist Albert Rees' 18 years old 
study, The Economies of Trade Unions (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1962), than from 
Burawoy's ethnographie data. 
Game theory, on the other hand, has 
been around since mid-World War II, initial-
ly attractive to labor relations scholars who 
desired to improve their understanding of in-
dustrial conflict and provide analysis for 
developing management Systems that de-
emphasized fundamental antagonisms be-
tween management, workers, and unions. 
Since the 1950's, this school was successfully 
challenged and largely disappeared from the 
literature. Burawoy neither acknowledges 
this debate nor illustrâtes why he is justified 
in resurrecting the thesis. It seems his choice 
is arbitrary and the date does not automati-
cally lead us to choose "game" as the explan-
atory variable. 
Two final criticisms conclude this re-
view. One is the overly deterministic rôle he 
attributes to capitalist institutions and man-
ager ial hegemony in the shop. For example, 
the logic of his argument about foremen-
worker relations is that management could 
avoid much of the existing industrial conflict 
by more rational and centralized planning. 
That is, many conflicts between labor and 
capital resuit from intra-management dis-
putes. At the same time, Burawoy fails to ad-
dress some of the important classical political 
théories that address the tough questions of 
social change. Even Marx qualified his éco-
nomie determinist formulations by noting the 
importance of the relations of social classes 
to their political leaders and the political and 
organizational possibilities that frame many 
of the workers' actions. Nothing is inévitable 
about économie relations. If that were not 
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true, management would ignore the grievance 
machinery and speed-up the line anytime 
market conditions and compétitive relations 
deemed it advantageous. Secondly, by his 
own choosing, he sacrifices "rich ethnogra-
phie data" he collected "for the sake of ex-
cursions into theorizing" (p. xiv). But what 
makes this study important is precisely the 
shop floor data. Therefore, I feel that a large 
part of the uniqueness in this study is left 
behind to our disadvantage. 
To conclude, the 1980's présent the stu-
dent of industrial sociology with unique and 
controversial problems that demand atten-
tion. Declining productivity, hîgh labor turn-
over rates, persistent inflation, highly volatile 
domestic and international product markets, 
a more heterogenous and younger labor force 
with significantly différent expectations from 
older workers, rapidly changing industrial 
relations Systems such as the new Quality of 
Worklife Programs and joint union-company 
political actions like the récent UAW-
Chrysler Corporation bail-out project, and 
the introduction of new technologies that are 
drastically changing the work environment 
require us to grapple with the labor question 
whether our rôle is in policy formation or job 
reform. Before we can do either requires ex-
tensive knowledge about what the man and 
woman working in our mines, mills, and fac-
tories need and demand. Thus, participant 
observation studies such as Burawoy's are an 
important first step in this direction. While 
his study raises certain problems and leaves 
many questions unanswered, it requires an 
ambitious and farsighted research project 
such as this one to engage in meaningful and 
fruit fui debate about thèse issues and pos-
sibly lead in the direction of a theory of the 
labor process. For that, we welcome this 
book with open arms, and pens and notepads 
ready. 
Craig A. ZABALA 
University of California 
U.S. Department of Labor 
The Quality of Working Life in Western and 
Eastern Europe, by Cary L. Cooper and 
Enid Memford, (eds), Westport, Green-
wood Press, 1979, 348 pp. 
The European expérience in the QWL 
field is of a growing importance and there-
fore the review of it in the book hère under 
considération should be of some use. The 
authors of contributions into the book are 
European specialists in the field, and they 
really know what they talk about. 
The contributions from public funds to 
the QWL projects hâve grown very consider-
ably during the 1970's. The scope of the 
QWL projects has gone much beyond the 
original focus mainly on the assembly Unes of 
the automobile industry. Now there is already 
a very considérable number of people actively 
involved in the QWL field; they consist of 
managers, trade unionists, ergonomists, 
social scientists, economists, accountants, 
représentants of various interest groups, etc. 
According to A.T.M. Wilson, there is a 
problem of finding common language be-
tween représentants of differing interests and 
orientations. In order to promote industrial 
participation, the promotors themselves hâve 
to secure mutual tolérance and acceptance. 
The growing governmental involvement in in-
dustrial relations, so évident for example in 
Sweden, contributes to the ncesssity of a team 
approach in the QWL field. In addition, 
there are in the modem world several impor-
tant forces that support the humanisation of 
work: the conviction of humanisers, the ecol-
ogical limits of growth, the increasing rates of 
structural unemployment, the increase in 
educational opportunities, the higher stan-
dard of living, the increasing research and 
concern for moral comfort, the necessity to 
share power and responsibility with trade 
unions. One of the questions is how much the 
humanisers will find common language with 
the objects of their effort. As G. Hofstede 
says, "For alienated workers to shift their 
values in the direction of those of human-
isers, will first hâve to start to shift theirs in 
the directions of those of the alienated work-
ers" (p. 34). 
